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Jaksa Cvitanic, Xuhu Wan, and Jianfeng Zhang
Abstract
We consider the problem of when to deliver the contract payoff, in a continuous-time principal-
agent setting, in which the agent’s effort is unobservable. The principal can design contracts of a
simple form that induce the agent to ask for the payoff at the time of the principal’s choosing. The
optimal time of payment depends on the agent’s and the principal’s outside options. We develop
a theory for general utility functions, while with CARA utilities we are able to specify conditions
under which the optimal payment time is not random. However, in general, the optimal payment
time is typically random. One illustrative application is the case when the agent can be fired, after
having been paid a severance payment, and then replaced by another agent. The methodology we
use is the stochastic maximum principle and its link to Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential
Equations.
KEYWORDS: principal-agent problems, real options, exit decisions, forward backward stochas-
tic differential equations
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for any remaining errors, and the opinions, findings and conclusions or suggestions in this arti-
cle do not necessarily reflect anyone’s opinions but the authors’. Research supported in part by
NSF grants DMS 04-03575, DMS 06-31298, DMS 06-31366, the grant DAG 05/06.BM28 from
HKUST, and through the Programme “GUEST” of the National Foundation For Science, Higher
Education and Technological Development of the Republic of Croatia.
1 Introduction
Standard exit problems are of the type
sup
τ
E[U(τ,Xτ − Cτ )] (1.1)
where Xt is the time t value of an output process, Ct is the cost of liquidating,
and τ is the exit time. Alternatively, τ can be thought of as the entry time,
Xt as the present value at time t of a project, and Cτ as the cost incurred
when entering the investment project. Classical references include McDonald
and Siegel (1986) and the book Dixit and Pindyck (1994). For a very general
model see, for example, Johnson and Zervos (2006), who also show how to
reduce mixed entry and exit problems with intertemporal profit/loss rate to
the standard optimal stopping problem of the type (1.1). We consider exit
problems in the case when the output process Xt can be influenced by actions
of an agent, and Cτ is interpreted as the payment from a principal to the
agent. In other words, we combine some of the classical real options problem of
optimal timing of investment/disinvestment decisions, with a contract theory
framework in which the value obtained from a project depends on the agent’s
effort. Our setting is mostly suited for exit problems, while we leave entry
problems for future research.
Some motivating examples for our work are the following. Company execu-
tives are often given options which they are free to exercise at any time during
a given time period; the possibility of exercising early (being paid early) is def-
initely beneficial for executives, but is it beneficial for the company? Another
application that we analyze in our framework is the question for a company
of when to fire the executive while paying her the severance payment, and
replace her with a new one.
In order to address questions like these, we develop a general principal-
agent theory with flexible time of payment, in a standard, stylized continuous-
time principal-agent models, in which the agent can influence the drift of the
process by her unobservable effort, while suffering a certain cost. The agent is
paid only once, at a random time τ . In our model, the timing of the payment
depends crucially on the “outside options” of the agent and of the principal.
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By outside options we mean the benefits and the costs the agent and the
principal will be exposed to, after the payment has occurred. In our general
framework, we model these as stochastic processes which are flexible enough to
include a possibility of the agent leaving the project, maybe being replaced by
another agent maybe not, or the agent staying with the project and applying
substandard effort, or the agent being retired with a severance package or
regular annuity payments, or any other modeling of the events taking place
after the payment time.
We allow for two different kinds of outside options: a benefit/cost which
is not separable from the principal/agent utility, which is suitable for mod-
eling cash payments the principal/agent receive from or have to pay to a
third party at or after the payment time; we also allow the outside option to
be separable from the principal/agent utility, which is suitable for modeling
non-monetary utility/cost they expect to incur after the payment time. Our
contributions are mostly methodological, providing tools and models for solv-
ing general problems. On the other hand, we do illustrate the methods with
some examples.
The paper that started the continuous-time principal-agent literature is
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987). That paper considers a model with moral
hazard, lump-sum payment at the end of the time horizon, and exponential
utilities. Because of the latter, the optimal contract is linear. Their frame-
work was extended by Scha¨ttler and Sung (1993, 1997), Sung (1995, 1997),
Detemple, Govindaraj, and Loewenstein (2001). See also Dybvig, Farnsworth
and Carpenter (2001), Hugonnier, J. and R. Kaniel (2001), Mu¨ller (1998,
2000), and Hellwig and Schmidt (2003). The papers Williams (2004) and
Cvitanic´, Wan and Zhang (2008) (henceforth CWZ 2008), use the stochastic
maximum principle and Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations
(FBSDEs) to characterize the optimal compensation for more general utility
functions, under moral hazard. Cvitanic´ and Zhang (2007) (henceforth CZ
2007) consider adverse selection in the special case of separable and quadratic
cost function on the agent’s action. Another paper with adverse selection in
continuous time is Sung (2005), in the special case of exponential utility func-
tions and only the initial and the final value of the output being observable.
A continuous-time paper which considers a random time of retiring the agent
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is Sannikov (2007). Moreover, He (2007) has extended Sannikov’s work to the
case of the agent controlling the size of the company. The paper Mason and
Va¨lima¨ki (2007) considers a continuous-time model in which the risk-neutral
agent is paid only when the project succeeds, by a risk-neutral principal, and
the agent’s actions influence only the probability of success. While their time
of payment is random, it is not a part of the contract, as in our case. The
optimal contract payment in their model is a linear function of the agent’s
remaining utility and the marginal cost of effort, while we work with gen-
eral utility functions, typically leading to nonlinear contracts. Another recent
work in this spirit is Philippon and Sannikov (2007). In their framework, the
compensation payment to the agent is continuous, while the investment occurs
at an optimal random time.
We discuss now the main contributions and results of our paper, and, in
particular, the main differences with CWZ (2008). First, as already mentioned
above, we find a convenient and very general way to model outside options for
the principal and the agent. In the previous literature this is usually either
not modeled at all (CWZ 2008), or it is modeled in a very simple way, as a
constant payment at the time of exiting the contract, or as a constant level of
promised utility (Sannikov 2007). Second, we show that when τ is interpreted
as the exercise time of payment to be decided by the agent, the principal
can “force” the agent to exercise at a time of the principal’s choosing, by an
appropriate payoff design. We show that this design can be accomplished in a
natural way, and leads to simple looking contracts in which the agent is paid
a low contract value unless she waits until the output hits a certain level. The
previous literature does not consider the possibility for the agent to choose
the optimal time of exiting the contract.
Next, we find general necessary conditions for the optimality of hidden
actions of the agent, with arbitrary utility functions for the principal and the
agent, and a separable cost function for the agent. This part is an extension
of CWZ (2008) to the case of exit option, and is technically similar to that
paper, but we state all the results and prove or sketch their proofs, for the
convenience of the reader. In particular, as usual in dynamic stochastic con-
trol problems of this type, the solution to the agent’s problem depends on her
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“value function”, that is, on her remaining expected utility process ∗ (what
Sannikov 2007 calls “promised value”). However, in the current paper this
process is no longer a solution to a standard Backward Stochastic Differen-
tial Equation (BSDE), but a reflected BSDE, because of the optimal stopping
component. The solution to the principal’s problem depends, in general, not
only on his and the agent’s remaining expected utilities, but also on the re-
maining expected ratio of marginal utilities (which is constant in the first-best
case, with no moral hazard).
We obtain new results in the variation on the classical Holmstro¨m-Milgrom
(1987) set-up, with exponential utilities and quadratic cost. That is, we de-
scribe more precisely how to find the optimal exit time, something which was
not modeled in the previous literature. It turns out that under a wide range
of “stationarity conditions”, it is either optimal to have the agent be paid
right away (to be interpreted as the end of the vesting period), or not be
paid early, but wait until the end. In other words, it is often not optimal
for the principal that the agent be given an option to exercise the payment
at a random time. For example, if the risk aversions and the cost of effort
are small, and the “total output process”, which is the sum of the output
plus the certainty equivalents of the outside options, is a submartingale (has
positive drift), then it is optimal not to have early payment. In general, the
optimal exit time problem reduces to an optimal stopping problem involving
the total output process. If the agent is risk-neutral, in analogy with the clas-
sical models, the principal “sells the whole firm” to the agent, in exchange for
a payment at the optimal stopping time in the future. Moreover, the agent
would choose the same optimal payment time as the principal, even if she was
not forced to do so.
In case of non-exponential utilities, we are able to provide semi-explicit re-
sults, assuming that the cost function of the agent is quadratic and separable.
This is possible because with the quadratic cost function the agent’s optimal
utility and the principal’s problem can both be represented in a simple form
which involves explicitly the contracted payoff only, and not the agent’s effort
∗In continuous-time stochastic control literature this method is known at least since
Davis and Varaiya (1973). In dynamic principal-agent problems in discrete-time, it is used,
among others, in Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986), (1990), and Phelan and Townsend
(1991).
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process. The ratio of the marginal utilities of the principal and the agent
depends now also on the principal’s utility. The optimal payoff depends in a
nonlinear way on the value of the output at the time of payment. The results
just described parallel those of CWZ (2008). Again, the new and different
aspect is finding the optimal payment time. We show that it is determined as
a solution to an optimal stopping problem of a standard type. The presence of
the option to exit makes the problem much more difficult than in CWZ (2008):
while, as just mentioned above, the payoff part of the contract is determined
in a direct way as a function of the output, the optimal payment time is de-
termined as a solution to a potentially hard optimal stopping problem. In an
example with a risk-neutral principal and a log agent, the optimal payoff is a
simple linear function, but the optimal payment time is much more complex
than in the exponential utilities case. The associated optimal stopping prob-
lem involves a nonlinear function of the value of the output, the value of the
principal’s outside option and it also depends on the agent’s outside option
process. These type of problems can, in general, be solved only numerically,
using PDE methods.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we consider a general model
with hidden action, while the case of exponential utilities is studied in Section
3. The quadratic cost case with general utilities is analyzed in Section 4. We
conclude in Section 5, and delegate most proofs to Appendix.
2 General moral hazard model
2.1 Optimization problems
We first describe the optimization problems of the agent and the principal,
before giving the details of the model. We assume first that the principal has
the right to choose the exercise time. However, we will show below that this
is equivalent to the case when the agent has that right. The agent’s problem
is, given an exercise time τ and a random payment Cτ at time τ ,
V A(τ, Cτ ) := sup
u
Eu
{
U1(τ, Cτ , A(τ, T ))−
∫ τ
0
g(ut)dt
}
. (2.1)
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Here u is the effort of the agent, A(τ, T ) is the value of the outside option,
discussed in more details below, function U1 is a utility function, and g is a
cost function. Note here that we assume that the cost is separable from the
utility due to the payoff and the outside options, which will not be the case
later below when we consider the Holmstro¨m-Milgrom (1987) framework with
exponential utilities.
Introduce the agent’s cumulative cost corresponding to not exercising early:
Gt :=
∫ t
0
g(us)ds; (2.2)
Also introduce a possibly random function U˜1(t, c), expected remaining utility
for the agent if she is paid c at time t:
U˜1(t, c) := E˜t[U1(t, c, A(t, T ))]. (2.3)
Then, we can write
V A(τ, Cτ ) = sup
u
Eu
{
U˜1(τ, Cτ )−Gτ
}
. (2.4)
If we consider only such contracts (τ, Cτ ) for which the agent’s problem
has a unique solution uˆ = uˆτ,Cτ , then, the principal’s problem is
V P := sup
τ,Cτ
V P (τ, Cτ ) := sup
τ,Cτ
Euˆ
{
U2(τ,Xτ , Cτ , P (τ, T ))
}
; (2.5)
where U2 is a function representing the principal’s utility, Xτ is the underlying
output process and P (τ, T ) is the value of the outside option of the principal.
The above problem has to be solved under the standard individual rationality
(IR) constraint, or participation constraint :
V A(τ, Cτ ) ≥ R0 (2.6)
In other words, the agent would not work for the principal for less than a
given constant R0, in terms of expected utility.
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2.2 Model details
We now present the model from CWZ (2008), which, in turn, is a variation on
the classical model from Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) and Schattler and
Sung (1993). Let B be a standard Brownian motion under some probability
space with probability measure P , and FB = {Ft}0≤t≤T be the information
filtration generated by B up to time T > 0. For a given FB-adapted process
v > 0 such that E
∫ T
0
v2t dt <∞, we introduce the value process of the output
Xt := x+
∫ t
0
vsdBs. (2.7)
Note that FX = FB.
As is standard for hidden action models, we will assume that the agent
changes the distribution of the output process X, by making the underlying
probability measure P u depend on agent’s action u. More precisely, for any
FB-adapted process u, to be interpreted as the agent’s action, and for a fixed
time horizon T , we let
But := Bt−
∫ t
0
usds; M
u
t := exp
(∫ t
0
usdBs−1
2
∫ t
0
|us|2ds
)
; P u(A) := E[MuT1A].
(2.8)
We assume here that u satisfies the conditions required by the Girsanov The-
orem (e.g. Novikov condition). In other words, we assume that u is such that
P u is a probability measure and Mut is a P
u-martingale on [0, T ]. Moreover,
Bu is a P u-Brownian motion and
dXt = vtdBt = utvtdt+ vtdB
u
t . (2.9)
Thus, the fact that the agent controls the distribution P u by her effort will
be interpreted as the agent controlling the drift process ut.
We suppose that the principal specifies a stopping time τ ≤ T and a
random payoff Cτ ∈ Fτ at time 0. We call τ the exercise time, in accordance
with the option pricing terminology. As we will see in Section 2.3.1, under
certain technical conditions, this is equivalent to the model that the principal
offers a family of contracts {Ct}0≤t≤T and the agent chooses a stopping time
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τ , at which the payoff Cτ is paid to the agent. For some applications, we
should interpret time t = 0 as the end of the vesting period before which the
agent cannot exercise the payment.
- 1. Dynamics for t ≤ τ : For t < τ , the agent applies effort ut and the
dynamics is as in (2.9).
- 2. Profit/Loss after exercise, if τ < T : We need to model what
happens if the contract is exercised early. We denote by P˜ , E˜, B˜ the probabil-
ity measure, the corresponding expectation operator, and the corresponding
Brownian Motion for the probability model after exercise time, and we intro-
duce the following notation:
- A(τ, T ) = the agent’s benefit/cost due to the early exercise of the
contract.
- P (τ, T ) = the principal’s benefit/cost due to the early exercise of the
contract.
- At = E˜t[A(t, T )] = the agent’s remaining expected benefit/cost due to
the early exercise of the contract.
- Pt = E˜t[P (t, T )] = the principal’s remaining expected benefit/cost due
to the early exercise of the contract.
Here, E˜t denotes conditional expectation under P˜ with respect to Ft. Ran-
dom variables A(t, T ) and P (t, T ) don’t have to be adapted to FT , they may
depend on some outside random factors, too. Note that A(t, T ), P (t, T ) do not
depend on u or τ . Also note that if A(t, T ) is deterministic then At = A(t, T ),
and similarly for Pt.
For example, we can have
A(τ, T ) = −
∫ T
τ
cAt dt (2.10)
and it may represent the cost the agent is facing after exercise, or, perhaps
more realistically, (−cA) determines the value of an outside option the agent
has of going to work for another principal, or simply a benefit for not applying
active effort. Similarly, we could have
P (τ, T ) =
∫ T
τ
[u˜tvt − cPt ]dt+
∫ T
τ
vtdB˜t (2.11)
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where u˜ has the interpretation of the drift after the exercise, and it may
have several components: some fixed effort by the agent if she has not left
the company, an “inertia” drift present without any effort, and/or an effort
applied by whoever is in charge after the agent has left. On the other hand, cP
may measure the cost faced by the principal after exercise, maybe for hiring
a new agent. The term
∫ T
τ
vtdB˜t is due to the noise term in the output, in
analogy to the same type of noise term before exercise.
In general, At, Pt are flexible enough to include a possibility of the agent
leaving the company, being replaced by another agent, the agent staying with
the company and applying substandard effort, firing of the the agent after
paying her a severance package or regular annuity payments, and many other
possibilities for taking into account the events occurring after the exercise
time.
Remark 2.1 Our formulation is suited for exit problems. If we wanted to
model entry problems, we would have to allow for a possibility that the entry
never happens, while we assume in this paper that the payment will definitely
be paid, at time T if not sooner. Moreover, with entry problems, it might be
more realistic to assume that the contract may be renegotiated at the entry
time.
2.3 Solving agent’s problem
Recall the agent’s problem (2.4), in which the admissible set for the effort
processes u will be specified in Definition 2.1 below.
It is by now standard in the continuous-time principal-agent literature
to consider the agent’s remaining utility process WA, and represent it using
the so-called Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE) form. More
precisely, in our model we can write WA in terms of its “volatility” process
wA for t < τ in the backward form as follows:†
†We note that in general FB
u
is smaller than FB , so one cannot apply directly the
standard Martingale Representation Theorem to guarantee the existence of an adapted
process wA,u in (2.12). Nevertheless, we can obtain wA,u by using a modified martingale
representation theorem (see, CWZ (2008) Lemma 3.1).
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WA,ut = E
u
t [U˜1(τ, Cτ )−
∫ τ
t
g(us)ds] = U˜1(τ, Cτ )−
∫ τ
t
g(us)ds−
∫ τ
t
wA,us dB
u
s .
(2.12)
We now specify some technical conditions. ‡
Assumption 2.1 (i) Cost function g is continuously twice differentiable with
g′′ > 0;
(ii) Utility function U1(t, c, a) is continuously differentiable in c with U
′
1 >
0, U ′′1 ≤ 0. Here U ′1, U ′′1 denote the partial derivatives of U1 with respect to c.
Definition 2.1 The set A1 of admissible effort processes u is the space of
FB-adapted processes u such that
(i) P (
∫ T
0
|ut|2dt <∞) = 1;
(ii) E{|MuT |4} <∞;
(iii) E{(∫ T
0
|g(ut)|dt) 83 + (
∫ T
0
|utg′(ut)|dt) 83 + (
∫ T
0
|g′(ut)|2dt) 43} <∞.
Condition (i) and (ii) are needed for the Novikov condition
E
{
e2
∫ T
0 |ut|2dt
}
<∞; (2.13)
which implies that Girsanov Theorem holds for (Bu, P u) (see CZ 2007). It
is seen in the proof of the proposition below that condition (iii) is suffi-
cient to guarantee that Eu{|U˜1(τ, Cτ )|2} < ∞, Eu{|
∫ τ
0
g(us)ds|2ds} < ∞
and Eu{| ∫ τ
0
g′(us)ds|2ds} < ∞, which are standard conditions needed when
studying BSDEs.
The following result has been known in one form or another from previous
work, with fixed τ = T ; see Schattler and Sung (1993), Sannikov (2007),
Williams (2003) and CWZ (2008). The result characterizes the agent’s optimal
expected utility process WAt as a solution to a BSDE with terminal condition
determined by the given contract, and it characterizes the optimal control of
the agent in terms of the associated volatility process wAt :
‡We mention that, in general, in this paper we do not aim to find the minimum set of
sufficient conditions.
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Proposition 2.1 Given a contract (τ, Cτ ), assume the following BSDE has
a unique solution (WA, wA):
WAt = U˜1(τ, Cτ )−
∫ τ
t
[g(I1(w
A
s ))− wAs I1(wAs )]ds−
∫ τ
t
wAs dBs, (2.14)
such that I1(w
A) ∈ A1, where
I1 := (g
′)−1
and wAt := 0 for t > τ . Then the agent’s unique optimal action is
uAt = I1(w
A
t )
and the agent’s optimal utility process isWAt = W
A,uA
t for t ≤ τ . In particular,
the optimal agent’s expected utility satisfies V A(τ, Cτ ) =W
A
0 .
We see that at the optimum
g′(uAt ) = w
A
t
which means that the marginal cost of effort is equal to the sensitivity (or
volatility) of the agent’s remaining utility with respect to the underlying un-
certainty, described by Brownian Motion B.
2.3.1 Implementability of the exercise time
In this subsection we assume that the agent has the right to choose the exercise
time and show that this is in fact equivalent to the model we discussed above.
To be precise, given a contract process {Ct}0≤t≤T , the agent’s problem is:
V A(C) := sup
τ
sup
u∈A1
Eu[U˜1(τ, Cτ )−
∫ τ
0
g(us)ds]. (2.15)
Then we have the following result.
Proposition 2.2 Assume that a pair (τ0, C
0
τ0
) satisfies the condition of Propo-
sition 2.1, and let (WA, uA) be the solution to the corresponding BSDE. Then,
there exists a process C such that Cτ0 = C
0
τ0
and WA0 = V
A(C).
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Proof. Note that
WAt = W
A
0 +
∫
t
0
g(uAs )ds+
∫
t
0
g′(uAs )dB
uA
s . (2.16)
For t ∈ [0, T ], let Ct := J(t,WAt ) where
J(t, ·) := U˜1(t, ·)−1 (2.17)
Then obviously Cτ0 = C
0
τ0
. Moreover, for any τ , by the proof of Proposition
2.1 in Appendix, we know that (τ, Cτ ) satisfies the condition of Proposition
2.1 and by the proposition, since U˜1(τ, Cτ ) =W
A
τ , we get from (2.16),
sup
u∈A1
Eu[U˜1(τ, Cτ )−
∫ τ
0
g(us)ds] =W
A
0 .
This ends the proof.
In fact, the proof shows that given the contract Ct = J(t,W
A
t ), the agent is
indifferent with respect to the exercise time. This is because with this contract,
for any t the principal is offering Ct which is the certainty equivalent of the
remaining expected utility. When indifferent, we assume that the agent will
choose the exercise time which is the best for the principal.
Remark 2.2 In this remark we further discuss how to construct a contract
process Ct in order to implement a desired contract (τ0, C
0
τ0
). Assume WA is
given as in Proposition 2.2.
(i) The principal can induce the agent to exercise the contract at τ0 by
offering Ct such that Cτ0 = J(τ0,W
A
τ0
) and Ct < J(t,W
A
t ) for t 6= τ0. In
particular, if we assume that Ct has a lowest possible value L (maybe −∞)
and that J(t,WAt ) > L, then the contract Ct := J(τ0,W
A
τ0
)1{t=τ0} + L1{t6=τ0}
will “force” the agent to choose the exercise time τ0.
(ii) When the model is Markovian, as in Remark 4.3 (ii) below, we have
τ0 = inf{t : f1(t,Xt) = 0} for some deterministic function f1(t, x) ≤ 0. By the
Markovian structure, one can show further that J(t,WAt ) = f2(t,Xt) for some
deterministic function f2(t, x) when t < τ0. We may choose some function
f3 such that f3(t, x) < f2(t, x) when f1(t, x) < 0 and f3(t, x) = f2(t, x) when
f1(t, x) = 0 (e.g. set f3(t, x) := f1(t, x) + f2(t, x)). Then Ct := f3(t,Xt)
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will induce the agent to choose exercise time τ0. In practice, in recent years
companies have started to modify usual executive compensation packages due
to related scandals, and one of the suggestions has been to allow payment
exercise only if the performance has been good enough, which is a contract
reminiscent of the above type.
Remark 2.3 Assume vt = σ(t,Xt) and U˜1(t, Ct) = l(t,Xt) for some deter-
ministic functions σ and l (e.g., if A(t, T ) is deterministic and Ct is a deter-
ministic function of (t,Xt)). Then, under certain technical conditions, the
agent’s problem is associated with the following PDE obstacle problem:{
max(ϕt +
1
2
ϕxxσ
2 − g(I1(ϕxσ)) + ϕσI1(ϕσ), l − ϕ) = 0;
ϕ(T, x) = l(T, x);
in the sense that WAt = ϕ(t,Xt). Moreover, the first optimal exercise time
of the agent is τ := inf{t : ϕ(t,Xt) = l(t,Xt)}, and before τ we always have
ϕ(t,Xt) > l(t,Xt).
2.4 Solving principal’s problem
We now fix the agent’s utility value to be R0, so that the IR constraint is
satisfied:
V A(τ, Cτ ) =W
A
0 = R0. (2.18)
In most cases this is without loss of generality, as we explain in Remark 2.4
below.
From now on we always assume (2.18) and that the pair (τ, Cτ ) satisfies
the conditions in Proposition 2.1. Recalling the principal’s problem (2.5), we
can write it as
V P = sup
τ,Cτ
V P (τ, Cτ ) := sup
τ,Cτ
EI1(w
A)
{
U2(τ,Xτ , Cτ , P (τ, T ))
}
;
where wA corresponding to (τ, Cτ ) is determined by Proposition 2.1 .
For u := I1(w
A), we have
WAt = R0 +
∫ t
0
g(us)ds+
∫ t
0
g′(us)dBus , t ≤ τ, (2.19)
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By Proposition 2.1 we can rewrite the principal’s problem as
V P := sup
τ
V P (τ) := sup
τ
sup
u∈A2(τ)
V P (τ ;u)
:= sup
τ
sup
u∈A2(τ)
Eu
{
U2(τ,Xτ , J(τ,W
A
τ ), P (τ, T ))
}
; (2.20)
where A2(τ) ⊂ A1 will be specified later in Definition 2.2. From now on, we
consider τ and u (instead of (τ, Cτ )) as the principal’s control, and we call u
an incentive compatible effort process.
Introduce a possibly random function U˜2(t, x, c), expected remaining utility
for the principal if the agent is paid c at time t:
U˜2(t, x, c) := E˜t
{
U2(t, x, c, P (t, T ))
}
. (2.21)
Then we have, for the principal’s utility V P (τ ;u) introduced in (2.20),
V P (τ ;u) = Eu
{
U˜2(τ,Xτ , J(τ,W
A
τ ))
}
. (2.22)
We are now ready to describe a general system of necessary conditions for
the principal’s problem in terms of four variables: the output X, the agent’s
remaining utilityWA, the principal’s remaining utilityW P , and the remaining
“ratio of marginal utilities” Y , where the latter two are defined by
W Pt := E
u
t
[
U˜2
(
τ,Xτ , J(τ,W
A
τ )
)]
; Yt := E
u
t
[
U˜ ′2
(
τ,Xτ , J(τ,W
A
τ )
)
U˜ ′1(τ, J(τ,WAτ ))
]
,
where U˜ ′2(t, x, c) denotes the partial derivative of U˜2 with respect to c. Fix
τ and u. Consider the following system of Forward-Backward SDEs, for t ∈
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[0, τ ], which has to be solved for processes X,WA, (W P , wP ), (Y, Z) :
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
vsdBs;
WAt = R0 +
∫ t
0
[
g(us)− g′(us)us
]
ds+
∫ t
0
g′(us)dBs;
W Pt = U˜2(τ,Xτ , J(τ,W
A
τ )) +
∫ τ
t
wPs usds−
∫ τ
t
wPs dBs;
Yt =
U˜ ′2(τ,Xτ , J(τ,W
A
τ ))
U˜ ′1(τ, J(τ,WAτ ))
+
∫ τ
t
Zsusds−
∫ τ
t
ZsdBs;
(2.23)
When there is a need to emphasize the dependence on the parameters τ, u, we
may use W P,τ,u instead of W P . The other notations can be defined similarly.
We now specify the technical conditions needed to derive the necessary
conditions of optimality.
Assumption 2.2 Function U2(t, x, c, p) is continuously differentiable in c with
U ′2 < 0, U
′′
2 ≤ 0, where U ′2, U ′′2 denote the partial derivatives of U2 with respect
to c; and for almost all ω, U˜2(t, x, c, ω) is uniformly continuous in t, uniformly
in (x, c).
Definition 2.2 For any stopping time τ , the set A2(τ) of admissible incentive
compatible effort processes u the principal can choose from is the space of FB-
adapted processes u over [0, τ ] such that
(i) u ∈ A1, where we take the convention that ut := 0 for t ∈ (τ, T ];
(ii) Eu{|U˜2(τ,Xτ , J(τ,WA,uτ ))|2+|U˜ ′2(τ,Xτ , J(τ,WA,uτ ))/U˜ ′1(τ, J(τ,WA,uτ ))|2} <
∞;
(iii) For any bounded ∆u ∈ FB, there exists ε0 > 0 such that for any
ε ∈ (0, ε0), uε := u+ ε∆u satisfies (i) and (ii) above and
Mu
ε
τ
[
|U˜2(τ,Xτ , J(τ,WA,uετ ))|2 + |U˜ ′2(τ,Xτ , J(τ,WA,u
ε
τ ))/U˜
′
1(τ, J(τ,W
A,uε
τ ))|2
]
are uniformly integrable under E, uniformly in ε.
Condition (ii) is a standard L2-condition needed for solving BSDEs in
(2.23). Condition (iii) is needed in order to be able to take the limit when
ε→ 0.
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Remark 2.4 Regarding the assumption (2.18), we could always work with
general R ≥ R0 instead, and then maximize over R as the final step. In other
words, we would need to solve the problem V P = supR≥R0 V
P (R). However,
recall that U ′1 > 0 and U
′
2 < 0. Then, for any fixed τ and u, the expectation
in the right side of (2.20) is decreasing in R and therefore, ignoring a possible
impact of R on the admissibility set A2(τ), V P (R) would be decreasing in R.
So the principal’s optimal choice would typically be R = R0.
We have the following necessary condition for optimality:
Proposition 2.3 Let uτ ∈ A2(τ) be the optimal incentive compatible effort
for the problem (2.20), but with τ fixed. Then the FBSDE (2.23) is satisfied
by a multiple of adapted processes (Xτ ,WA,τ ,W P,τ , Y τ , wP,τ , Zτ ), such that
wP,τt + g
′′(uτt )Z
τ
t = 0, ∀t ≤ τ. (2.24)
Moreover, the principal’s problem becomes
V P = sup
τ
W P,τ0 , (2.25)
and the optimal payoff satisfies
Cτ = J(τ,W
A
τ ).
We remark that in CWZ (2008) it was shown that if the condition (2.24)
uniquely determines u as a function of wP,τ , Zτ , and if the corresponding
FBSDE (2.23) is well-posed in the sense of having a unique solution and
satisfies a stability condition, then sufficiency also holds true, that is, uτ is
optimal. However, in general it is difficult to check the well-posedness of such
a coupled FBSDE. On the other hand, when g is quadratic, we argue below
directly that the necessary conditions we obtain are also sufficient. Note also
that the quadrati case is special, in the sense that the necessary condition gives
that the sensitivity to the underlying uncertainty of the principal’s remaining
utility is proportional to that sensitivity of the expected ratio of the final
marginal utilities.
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3 Exponential utilities
In this section we study the classical set-up of Holmstro¨m-Milgrom (1987),
with exponential utilities, but with the time of payment chosen optimally,
and possibly random. The main economic conclusions will be the following:
- The optimal payment time depends on the nature of the “total output
process”, equal to the output process plus certainty equivalents of the outside
options. In particular, the payment time will depend on the relationship
between the trends and the volatilities of such processes.
- Under specific stationarity conditions on the trends and volatilities, it is
optimal to either pay right away (to be interpreted as the end of the vesting
period) or wait until the end.
- If, in addition, the outside options are independent of the randomness
driving the output process, the optimal contract is linear and of the same form
as in Holmstro¨m-Milgrom (1987).
- A risk neutral agent will be given the whole output value in exchange for
cash, as is usual in these types of problems. She will agree with the principal
on what is the optimal payment time.
We assume
U1(t, x) = − 1
γA
exp(−γAx); U2(t, x) = − 1
γP
exp(−γPx). (3.1)
Introduce the certainty equivalents of the expected benefits/costs after exer-
cise:
A˜t = − 1
γA
log E˜t[e
−γAA(t,T )]; P˜t = − 1
γP
log E˜t[e
−γPP (t,T )].
Moreover, assume utilities non-separable in the contract payoff, outside op-
tions A(t, T ), P (t, T ) and the cost, that is, assume the agent and the principal
are maximizing
Eu[U1(Cτ −Gτ + A˜τ )], Eu[U2(Xτ − Cτ + P˜τ )].
The state process X is still given by (2.9).
We note that this model is not covered in Section 2 because the cost is
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non-separable here. In general, it is difficult to extend the previous results to
the case with a general utility and non-separable cost. However, due to the
special structure here, we are still able to solve the problem following similar
arguments as in Section 2, as we do next. For simplicity, in this section we
omit the technical conditions and assume all the terms involved have good
integrability properties so that all the calculations are valid.
Given a contract (τ, Cτ ), the agent’s remaining utility W
A
t can be repre-
sented as, for some adapted process ZA,
WAt := E
u
t [U1(Cτ −Gτ + A˜τ )]
= − 1
γA
exp
[
−γA
(
Cτ −
∫ τ
0
g(us)ds+ A˜τ
)]
+
∫ τ
t
WAs Z
A
s dB
u
s .
Introduce the “certainty equivalent” process
W˜At := −
1
γA
log(−γAWAt ) +
∫ t
0
g(us)ds
We have the following result for the agent’s problem.
Proposition 3.1 Given a contract (τ, Cτ ), the optimal effort u of the agent
satisfies the necessary and sufficient condition
γAg
′(ut) = ZAt . (3.2)
Moreover, for the optimal u we have
Cτ = W˜
A
0 − A˜τ +
∫ τ
0
[
1
2
γA(g
′(us))2 + g(us)− usg′(us)
]
ds+
∫ τ
0
g′(us)dBs
(3.3)
Condition (3.2) is the usual condition that the marginal cost of effort is
proportional to the sensitivity to the underlying uncertainty of the agent’s
remaining utility. Expression (3.3) shows how the optimal contract depends
on the cost of effort and the marginal cost of effort.
Introduce now the certainty equivalent R˜0 of the agent’s reservation wage
R0:
R˜0 = − 1
γA
log(−γAR0)
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We now assume W˜A0 = R˜0 and consider (τ, u) as the principal’s control. Let
Cτ be determined by (3.3) with W˜
A
0 = R˜0. Define the principal’s remaining
utility
W Pt := E
u
t [U2(Xτ − Cτ + P˜τ )]
= − 1
γP
exp
[
−γP
(
Xτ − Cτ + P˜τ
)]
+
∫ τ
t
W Ps Z
P
s dB
u
s ,
We will also need in the proofs the principal’s “certainty equivalent” process
W˜ Pt := −
1
γP
log(−γPW Pt ). (3.4)
We have the following characterization of the optimal effort:
Proposition 3.2 Given τ , the optimal incentive compatible effort u for the
principal has to satisfy the necessary condition
ZPt =
γAγPg
′(ut)g′′(ut)
1 + γPg′′(ut)
. (3.5)
Recall that the volatility of the agent’s remaining utility ZAt = γAg
′(ut)
depends only on the agent’s risk aversion and marginal cost of effort, while we
see that the volatility of the principal’s remaining utility depends, in addition,
on the principal’s risk aversion and the rate of change of marginal utility g′′.
However, if the cost function g is quadratic, then also the volatility of the
principal’s remaining utility is proportional to the marginal cost of effort.
3.1 Quadratic cost and exponential utilities
The above analysis does not tell us how to determine the optimal payoff time
τ . In order to get some results in that direction, we assume now
g(u) = ku2/2.
Denote
α :=
1 + γPk
(γA + γP )k2 + k
; β :=
1 + γPk − γAγPk2
(γA + γP ) k2 + k
;
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and introduce the expected “total output” process St, the sum of the current
output and the certainty equivalents of the after-exercise benefits/costs for
the agent and the principal:
St := Xt + A˜t + P˜t.
We have the following
Proposition 3.3 (i) Given (τ, Cτ ), u is optimal for the agent if and only if
ut =
1
kγA
ZAt .
(ii) An incentive-compatible u is optimal for the principal if and only if
(introducing new notation Z˜)
ut = αZ˜t := α
[
ZPt
γP
+ g′(ut)
]
. (3.6)
(iii) If β = 0, the optimal stopping problem is equivalent to sup
τ
E(Sτ ).
(iv) If β > 0, the optimal stopping problem is equivalent to sup
τ
E
{
eβSτ
}
.
(v) If β < 0, the optimal stopping problem is equivalent to inf
τ
E{eβSτ}.
Results (i) and (ii) are the optimality conditions specialized to the quadratic
cost. Results (iii)-(v) give a complete characterization of the optimal stopping
problem faced by the principal.
The following results specify the optimal stopping time more explicitly.
Whenever not specified, we assume that sub-,super-, or regular martingale
property refers to the probability P . The first proposition is a direct conse-
quence of Proposition 3.3 (iii)-(v).
Proposition 3.4 (i) In the following cases it is optimal to exercise right away
(i.e. τ = 0):
- β ≤ 0 and St is a super-martingale;
- β > 0 and eβSt is a super-martingale;
- β < 0 and eβSt is a sub-martingale.
(ii) In the following cases it is optimal to wait until time T :
- β ≥ 0 and St is a sub-martingale;
- β > 0 and eβSt is a sub-martingale;
- β < 0 and eβSt is a super-martingale.
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Remark 3.1 Note that β > 0 if the risk aversion parameters γA, γP and/or
the cost parameter k are small enough, and β < 0 if the risk aversions or
the cost are large enough. Thus, the proposition tells us: (i) in case the risk
aversions and cost are small enough: if the drift of eβSt is negative then it is
optimal not to wait at all, while if that drift, or the drift of St is positive,
it is optimal to wait until the end; (ii) in case the risk-aversions or the cost
are large enough, if the drift of St or the drift of −eβSt is negative then it is
optimal not to wait at all, while if the drift of −eβSt is positive, it is optimal
to wait until the end.
Intuitively, if there is a tendency of (a monotone increasing transformation
of) the expected total output to move in the positive direction, it is better to
postpone the payment, while if the tendency is in the negative direction, it is
better to pay right away. However, if the expected total output can go both
up and down in expected value, the optimal time of payment is likely to be a
random time between zero and T .
We now provide more specific results if the total output S is a Gaussian
process:
Proposition 3.5 Assume that the total output process satisfies
dSt = µtdt+ ρtdBt,
for some deterministic µ and ρ. Then the optimal stopping time τ is deter-
ministic. Moreover, we have
(i) If β = 0, then the problem is equivalent to max
τ
∫ τ
0
µtdt. If particular,
if µ ≤ 0, then τ = 0; and if µ ≥ 0, then τ = T .
(ii) If β > 0, then the problem is equivalent to max
τ
∫ τ
0
[
1
2
β2ρ2t +βµt]dt. In
particular, if 1
2
β2ρ2+βµ ≤ 0, then τ = 0; and if 1
2
β2ρ2+βµ ≥ 0, then τ = T .
(iii) If β < 0, then the problem is equivalent to min
τ
∫ τ
0
[
1
2
β2ρ2t +βµt]dt. In
particular, if 1
2
β2ρ2+βµ ≥ 0, then τ = 0; and if 1
2
β2ρ2+βµ ≤ 0, then τ = T .
(iv) If we assume furthermore that A˜t and P˜t are deterministic (that is,
after exercise benefits/costs A(t, T ) and P (t, T ) are independent of Ft), and
21
Cvitanic et al.: Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
v is deterministic, then
Z˜t = ρt = vt, ∀t ≤ τ ; (3.7)
and
Cτ = f(τ) + kαXτ , (3.8)
for some deterministic function f . That is, the optimal contract is of the same
linear form as in the case of the fixed exercise time of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
(1987).
Remark 3.2 Intuitively, (ii) and (iii) tell us that if the drift µ of the total
output sufficiently overwhelms its uncertainty ρ2, then it is optimal to pay
right away or at the end, depending on the sign of µ. Actually, and more pre-
cisely, higher uncertainty leads to postponing the payment if the risk aversions
or the cost are low enough (β > 0), and it leads to speeding up the payment
if the risk aversions and the cost are high enough.
(b) On one hand, we see that Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) result is
robust assuming enough stationarity in the underlying model. On the other
hand, without such assumptions, their simple linear contract would not be
optimal, in general.
Remark 3.3 Risk-neutral agent. Assume U1(t, x) = x. We can formally get
the results by modifying the agent’s utility in (3.1) to U1(t, x) = − 1γA [e−γAx−
1], and sending γA → 0. We note that, however, all the results here can be
proved rigorously. First, by (3.5) and γA = 0 we get Z
p = 0. This, together
with (6.23) in Appendix, implies a simple expression for the optimal contract,
with W˜ P defined in (3.4):
Cτ = Xτ + P˜τ − W˜ P0 (3.9)
That is, as usual with a risk-neutral agent, the principal “sells the whole
business” Xτ + P˜τ to the agent in exchange for a cash payment, equal to the
principal’s initial certainty equivalent W˜ P0 . It can also readily be shown that
the agent’s optimal stopping problem is equivalent to the principal’s, hence
the agent will implement the exercise time τ which is optimal for the principal,
without being told when to exercise.
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4 Moral hazard with general utilities and quadratic
cost function
We now specialize the general model of Section 2 with separable cost to the
case of quadratic cost. As analyzed in CWZ (2008) and CZ (2007), the case
when the agent’s cost is quadratic makes the cases of non-exponential utilities
more tractable. We follow those papers and in this section we assume
g(u) =
1
2
u2. (4.1)
We could use the theory developed in Section 2, but we choose to provide here
an alternative direct approach, which requires weaker conditions§.
Recall that the agent’s problem is to maximize Eu[U˜1(τ, Cτ )−Gτ ]. As in
Section 2.1 we consider u ∈ A1 as the agent’s control. But unlike in Section
2.2 where we consider (τ, u) as the principal’s control, in this case we consider
(τ, Cτ ) as the control. We first note that, by (2.13), Definition 2.1 (iii) is the
consequence of (i) and (ii). We next specify the technical conditions (τ, Cτ )
should satisfy, which is in general not equivalent to A2 in Section 2.2.
Definition 4.1 The admissible set A3 of the principal is the space of (τ, Cτ )
satisfying
(i) E{|U˜1(τ, Cτ )|4 + e4U˜1(τ,Cτ )} <∞.
(ii) E{|U˜2(τ,Xτ , Cτ )|2 + eU˜1(τ,Cτ )|U˜2(τ,Xτ , Cτ )|} <∞.
Moreover, in this section Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are always in force.
We have the following result, analogous to CWZ (2008), but extended to
our framework of the random time of exercise and random benefits/costs after
exercise. Again, without loss of generality we will always assume WA0 = R0.
Proposition 4.1 For any (τ, Cτ ), the optimal effort uˆ for the agent is ob-
tained by solving the BSDE
W¯t = Et[e
U˜1(τ,Cτ )] = eU˜1(τ,Cτ ) −
∫ τ
t
uˆsW¯sdBs (4.2)
§It should be mentioned, though, that we originally used the general theory to solve
problems like this, and only then realized that there was a different direct approach.
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Moreover, the agent’s remaining expected utility is determined by
WAt = log(W¯t).
In particular, the agent’s expected utility is
R0 = W
A
0 = log W¯0 = logE[e
U˜1(τ,Cτ )]. (4.3)
In addition, with the change of probability measure densityMu defined in (2.8),
we have, for t ≤ τ ,
M uˆt = exp(W
A
t −R0) , hence M uˆτ = e−R0eU˜1(τ,Cτ ). (4.4)
Proof: First by Definition 4.1 (i) and the arguments in CWZ (2008), we
know (4.2) is well-posed and uˆ ∈ A1. Denote WAt := log(W¯t), wAt := uˆt. By
Ito’s formula one can check straightforwardly that (WA, wA) satisfy (2.14),
and thus, by Proposition 2.1, uˆ is the agent’s optimal action. Moreover, by
(4.2) we have W¯t = W¯0M
uˆ
t . Since we assume W
A
0 = R0, the other claims are
obvious now.
Remark 4.1 (i) Simple relationships (4.3) and (4.4) between the agent’s op-
timal utility, the “optimal change of probability” Muτ and the given contract
Cτ are possible because of the assumption of quadratic cost. These expres-
sions make the problem tractable. In particular, at the optimum the agent’s
remaining expected utility is obtained simply by exponentiating her utility,
taking conditional expectation and then inverting the exponentiation by tak-
ing the logarithm. And the optimal effort is simply the sensitivity of the
remaining expected utility with respect to the underlying uncertainty.
(ii) In the language of option pricing theory finding optimal u by solving
(4.2) is equivalent to finding a replicating portfolio for the option with payoff
eU˜1(τ,Cτ ). Various methods have been developed for this purpose, including
PDE methods.
We now investigate the principal’s problem. Denote by λe−R0 the Lagrange
multiplier for the IR constraint (4.3). By (2.22), Proposition 4.1 and recalling
that Eu[Xτ ] = E[M
u
τXτ ] for an Fτ−measurable random variable Xτ , we can
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rewrite the constrained principal’s problem as
sup
τ,Cτ
E
{
Muτ U˜2(τ,Xτ , Cτ ) + λe
−R0eU˜1(τ,Cτ )
}
= sup
τ,Cτ
e−R0E
{
eU˜1(τ,Cτ )[U˜2(τ,Xτ , Cτ ) + λ]
}
. (4.5)
The principal wants to maximize this expression over Cτ . We have the follow-
ing result, extending an analogous result from CWZ (2008) to our framework.
Proposition 4.2 Assume that the contract Ct is required to satisfy
Lt ≤ Ct ≤ Ht
for some Ft−measurable random variables Lt, Ht, which may take infinite
values. Suppose that, with probability one, there exists a finite value Cˆλτ (ω) ∈
[Lτ (ω), Hτ (ω)] that maximizes
eU˜1(τ,Cτ )[U˜2(τ,Xτ , Cτ ) + λ], (4.6)
that there exists an optimal exercise time τ(λ) that solves
sup
τ
E
{
eU˜1(τ,Cˆ
λ
τ )[U˜2(τ,Xτ , Cˆ
λ
τ ) + λ]
}
(4.7)
and that λ can be found so that
E[eU˜1(τ(λ),Cˆ
λ
τ(λ)
)] = eR0 .
Then, Cˆλτ(λ) is the optimal contract, and τ(λ) is the optimal exercise time.
Note that the problem of maximizing (4.6) over Cτ is a one-variable de-
terministic optimization problem (for any given ω), thus much easier than the
original problem.
Remark 4.2 In parts (i) and (ii) of this remark we consider the case when
there is an interior solution for the problem of maximizing (4.6) over Cτ .
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(i) The first order condition for that problem is given by
− U˜
′
2(τ,Xτ , Cτ )
U˜ ′1(τ, Cτ )
= λ+ U˜2(τ,Xτ , Cτ ). (4.8)
This extends the standard Borch rule for risk-sharing in the first-best (full
information) case, with fixed τ = T :
−U
′
2(XT , CT )
U ′1(CT )
= λ. (4.9)
We conclude that the second-best contract is “more nonlinear” than the first-
best. For example, if both utility functions are exponential, U2(x, c) = U2(x−
c), and we require Ct ≥ L > −∞, the first-best contract CT is linear in XT for
CT > L. The second-best contract is nonlinear. In addition, in our framework
the contract also needs to take into account the future uncertainty about the
benefit/cost after exercise, which is why Ui is replaced by U˜i.
(ii) Here is an explanation of the difference between the first-best and the
second-best first order condition. Assume for simplicity that At ≡ Pt ≡ 0. In
the first best case, what is maximized is the expected utility of U2(XT , CT ) +
λU1(CT ), which leads directly to the Borch condition of marginal utilities be-
ing proportional. However, in the second best case, according to Proposition
4.1, the agent chooses the action u which corresponds to the sensitivity to the
underlying uncertainty of logEt[e
U1(CT )] and not of logEt[e
U2(XT ,CT )+λU1(CT )].
Moreover, this action is such that the probability measure is changed to
P u(A) = e−R0E[1AeU1(CT )]. That is, the agent chooses the distribution which
puts more weight on the outcomes in which the contract payoff has a high
value. The principal needs to maximize her expected utility under this par-
ticular choice of distribution, and under the IR constraint. Because this dis-
tribution favors the states in which the agent is paid more, the principal’s
marginal utility, marginal with respect to the contract payoff, has to go down
relative to the first best case. It is optimal for the principal to reduce it by the
amount of U ′1U2. In other words, in the states the principal has more utility,
he sacrifices more of his marginal utility relative to the agent’s.
(iii) In our model with quadratic cost and the separable utility for the
agent, the optimal contract still has a relatively simple form, as it is a (possibly
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random) function of τ and the value of the output Xτ at the time of payment.
It was noted in CWZ (2008) in case of fixed τ = T , and it’s also true here, that
the sensitivity of the contract with respect to Xτ is higher in the second-best
case than in the first-best, as expected. Moreover, it was observed that higher
marginal utility for either party causes the slope of the contract to increase
relative to the first-best case, but more so for higher marginal utility of the
agent.
(iv) With exponential utilities, under a wide range of conditions provided
in Proposition 3.4, the optimal stopping time is either τ = 0 or τ = T .
However, here, the optimal stopping time in (4.7) would be equal to 0 or T
only under much more restrictive conditions.
Remark 4.3 We discuss here how to solve the optimal stopping problem
(4.7).
(i) Denote
Θt := e
U˜1(t,Cˆλt )[U˜2(t,Xt, Cˆ
λ
t ) + λ].
Assume Θ is a continuous process and the following Reflected BSDE has a
unique solution (W P , wP , KP ):{
W Pt = ΘT −
∫ T
t
wPs dBs +K
P
T −KPt ;
W Pt ≥ Θt;
∫ T
0
[W Pt −Θt]dKPt = 0.
(4.10)
Then the principal’s optimal utility is W P0 , and the optimal exercise time is
τ(λ) := inf{t : W Pt = Θt}.
(ii) Assume the following Markovian structure: 1) Xt = x+
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs)dBs
where σ is a deterministic function; 2) X is Markovian under P˜ (e.g., u˜ is
a deterministic function of (t,Xt)); 3) A(t, T ) and P (t, T ) are conditionally
independent of FBt under P˜ , given Xt (for example, if A(t, T ) and P (t, T ) are
deterministic); and 4) Lt = L¯(t,Xt) and Ht = H¯(t,Xt) for some deterministic
functions L¯ and H¯ (which may take values ∞ and −∞). Then U˜1(t, c) =
U¯1(t, c,Xt) and U˜2(t, x, c) = U¯2(t, x,Xt, c) for some deterministic functions
U¯1, U¯2. Therefore, when maximizing (4.6) we have Cˆ
λ
t = C¯(t,Xt) and thus
Θt = Θ¯(t,Xt) for some deterministic functions C¯(t, x) and Θ¯(t, x). In this
case the Reflected BSDE (4.10) is associated to the following PDE obstacle
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problem: max
(
ϕt(t, x) +
1
2
ϕxx(t, x)σ
2(t, x), Θ¯(t, x)− ϕ(t, x)
)
= 0;
ϕ(T, x) = Θ¯(T, x);
(4.11)
in the sense that W Pt = ϕ(t,Xt). Moreover, the optimal exercise time is
τ := inf{t : ϕ(t,Xt) = Θ¯(t,Xt)}.
We now show that with no outside options for the agent, a risk-neutral
principal typically would not want to pay early in case the drift of his after
exercise benefits/costs process is positive.
Proposition 4.3 Assume U2(t, x, c, p) = x− c+ p, U1(t, c, a) = U1(c) and
lim
c→−∞
ceU1(c) = 0; L = −∞; H =∞. (4.12)
If the principal’s after exercise benefits/costs process Pt is a P−submartingale,
then the optimal exercise time is τ = T .
4.1 Example: Risk neutral principal and log utility for
the agent; hiring a new agent
Assume now that U1(t, c, A) = γ[log(c) +A], U2(t, x, c, p) = x− c+ p and the
model is
dXt = σXt (utdt+ dB
u
t ) (4.13)
where σ is a known constant. Thus, Xt > 0 for all t. From (4.5) and the IR
constraint, the principal’s problem can be shown to reduce to
sup
τ,Cτ
Eθ
{
eγ[Aτ+log(Cτ )] [Xτ − Cτ + Pτ + λ]
}
(4.14)
We get, assuming the following value Cτ is positive, that
Cτ =
γ
1 + γ
[Xτ + Pτ + λ] (4.15)
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where λ will be obtained from the IR constraint
eR0 = E[Cγτ e
γAτ ]. (4.16)
We assume that the model is such that Cτ > 0 (see the example below). Then,
substituting Cτ from (4.15) into (4.14), we get that the principal has to solve
sup
τ
E
{
eγAτ (Xτ + Pτ + λ)
1+γ} (4.17)
Let’s summarize the previous in the following
Proposition 4.4 Assume a risk-neutral principal and a log agent, and model
(4.13). Consider the stopping time τˆ = τˆ(λ) which solves the problem (4.17)
and the contract Cλτˆ from (4.15). Assume that there exists a unique λˆ which
solves (4.16) with Cτ = C
λ
τˆ , and that C
λˆ
τˆ is a strictly positive random variable.
Then, (τˆ , C λˆτˆ ) is the optimal contract.
Remark 4.4 If At = 0, and Pt is a non-negative P -submartingale, then the
process (Xt+Pt+λ)
1+γ is a P−submartingale, and it is optimal to wait until
maturity, τ = T . In general, the optimal time depends on the properties of
the process eγAτ (Xτ + Pτ + λ)
1+γ. If this process is a P−submartingale, then
it is not optimal to exercise early, and if it is a supermartingale, then it is
optimal to exercise right away. However, there seem to be no general natural
conditions for this to happen when process A is not zero, unlike the conditions
of Proposition 3.4 in the CARA case. Thus, it is more likely in this framework
that the optimal time of payment will, indeed, be random. We work out a
specific example in this spirit next.
4.1.1 Paying off the agent and hiring a new one
In this subsection we assume that the principal can pay off the agent, then
hire another agent, or not hire anyone. If no agent is hired after τ , we assume
that after τ the effort u is fixed, and normalized to zero. We also assume that
if the new agent is hired, she will stay until time T (for simplicity). Thus, the
principal makes two decisions, when to pay (fire) the first agent, and whether
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to hire another one.¶
As above, the principal is risk-neutral. We can then model the option to
fire/hire as an outside option for the principal as follows:
Pτ = E˜τ [P (τ, T )] = max
(
P hτ , P
n
τ
)
where P nτ is the (optimal) conditional expected utility if the principal doesn’t
hire the agent at time τ ,
P nτ := E
0
τ {XT −Xτ}
and P hτ is the (optimal) conditional expected utility of the principal if he hires
a new agent at time τ ,
P hτ = sup
CnewT ,u
Euτ {XT − CnewT −Xτ}
under the IR constraint
Euτ
{
Unew1 (C
new
T )−
∫ T
τ
gnew(us)ds
}
≥ R(τ),
where R(t) is the reservation wage of the new agent, prevailing at time t. There
is no cost of searching for another agent, who can be hired immediately, and
at no extra cost.‖ The principal’s problem at time zero is then
sup
τ,Cτ ,u
Eu {Xτ − Cτ + Pτ}
under the IR constraint
Eu
{
U1 (τ, Cτ , A(τ, T ))−
∫ τ
0
g(us)ds
}
≥ R0
We now show that, with log agents, if the new agent is sufficiently expen-
sive, and if the time to maturity T is small relative to the variance of the
¶A similar problem is considered in Wang (2005), but with a fixed time of firing, in a
different, much simpler model.
‖However, we could easily add a one time fixed cost of hiring the new agent as an
additional term in Phτ .
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output σ2, the principal will not fire/pay the first agent before the terminal
time T . However, if either the new agent is not very expensive, or the time
to maturity T is large relative to the variance σ2, the time of payment will be
random. Moreover, the principal will never fire the first agent right away, at
τ = 0. The reader not interested in the technical details of the example, can
skip the rest of the section.
Assume
Unew1 (x) = log(x), dXt = σXtdBt, g(u) = g
new(u) = u2/2
We have
P nτ = E
0
τ {XT −Xτ} = 0
Similarly as in (4.15) (with γ = 1, τ = T and PT = 0)), we get
CnewT =
1
2
(XT + λτ )
where λτ is chosen so that Eτ
[
elog(C
new
T )
]
= eR(τ), that is
λτ = −2eR(τ) +Xτ
so that
CnewT =
1
2
(XT −Xτ ) + eR(τ)
We assume that the reservation wage R(τ) is sufficiently large to make CnewT >
0, that is, we assume
eR(t) >
1
2
Xt
We then have, noting that Eτ [X
2
T ] = X
2
τ e
σ2(T−τ),
P hτ +Xτ = Eτ {CnewT (XT − CnewT )}
= Eτ
{(
1
2
(XT −Xτ ) + eR(τ)
)(
1
2
(XT +Xτ )− eR(τ)
)}
= −e2R(τ) + eR(τ)Xτ + 1
4
X2τ [e
σ2(T−τ) − 1]
Consider now the case when the first agent also has log utility: U1(t, x, A) =
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log(x) +A. As in (4.17) (with γ = 1), the principal’s problem at time zero is
now
sup
τ
E
{
eAτ (Xτ + Pτ + λ)
2} (4.18)
where Pτ = max
(
P hτ , 0
)
. Assume, moreover,
At ≡ 0 , eR(t) = kX(t) , k > 1
2
The first condition means that the first agent’s expected cost/benefit after the
payment is zero, which would be the case, if, for example the after-exercise
benefit/cost satisfies A(t, T ) = cXt for some constant c; the second condition
means that the new agent’s reservation utility is more than log of half of the
output. We can now compute that
Pτ = max
(
0, X2τ [k − k2 +
1
4
(eσ
2(T−τ) − 1)]−Xτ
)
In particular, if k is large enough, meaning the new agent is sufficiently
expensive, and if the time to maturity T is sufficiently small relative to the
variance σ2, we will have Pτ ≡ 0 always, and, since (Xt + λ)2 is a submartin-
gale, the principal will not fire/pay the first agent before the terminal time
T . However, if either the new agent is not very expensive, or the time to
maturity T is not small relative to the variance σ2, Pτ will oscillate between
zero and positive values, (Xt + Pt + λ)
2 will not be a submartingale (nor a
supermartingale), and the optimal time of payment will be random. It would
have to be computed numerically, solving problem (4.18). Note also that the
principal will never fire the first agent right away, at τ = 0.
5 Conclusions
We have developed a methodology for studying continuous-time principal-
agent problems with hidden action in case the agent is paid once, at an optimal
random time. We have identified conditions under which it is optimal to pay
the agent as soon as possible, and conditions under which it is optimal to pay
her as late as possible. Our framework can be a basis for many possible natural
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extensions and applications, such as: (i) introduce an additional random time
of auditing, after which the return of the output may change, due to the new
information on whether the agent has manipulated the output; (ii) give the
agent more bargaining power, and, in particular, let the agent dictate the
timing of the (possibly multiple) payoffs; in the same spirit, allow the agent
to quit at or after the time she is paid; (iii) in general, model more precisely
the uncertainty about the future outside options; (iv) allow renegotiation to
take place and consider reputation effects; (v) add intermediate consumption
and possibility of paying the agent at a continuous rate, as in Sannikov (2007)
and Williams (2004), but in our setup; (vi) adapt the methods developed here
to the case of entry problems, such as the case when τ is the time when a big
pharmaceutical company enters a project with a small biotech firm, or it is
the time when a venture capitalist decides to fund a project.
It is also possible to study hidden type/adverse selection problems with
random time of payment, extending CZ (2007). In this context, it would be
of interest to consider the case in which the agent is also uncertain about her
type; for example, if the type influences the return of the output, then even
without existence of outside options, the principal and the agent might want
the payment to be paid early, as they update their information on the true
return.
A different direction would be to allow the agent to also control the volatil-
ity of the output, as is the case in delegated portfolio management problems.
However, this will require studying a combined problem of stochastically con-
trolling the volatility of a random process together with an optimal stopping
problem. There is very little theory for these problems, and no general condi-
tions under which the solution can be found; see Karatzas and Wang (2001)
and Henderson and Hobson (2008) for some special cases.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1: It suffices to prove WAt ≥ WA,ut for any u ∈ A1.
Without loss of generality, we assume t = 0. Our proof here follows the
arguments of CWZ (2008).
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First, note that
U˜1(τ, Cτ ) =W
A
0 +
∫ τ
0
[g(uAs )− uAs g′(uAs )]ds+
∫ τ
0
g′(uAs )dBs.
Let Γ denote a constant which may vary from line to line. Then by Definition
2.1 (iii) we have
E{|U˜1(τ, Cτ )| 83} ≤ ΓE
{
1+(
∫ T
0
|g(uAs )|ds)
8
3+(
∫ T
0
|uAs g′(uAs )|ds)
8
3+(
∫ T
0
|g′(uAs )|2ds)
4
3
}
<∞.
Thus
Eu{|U˜1(τ, Cτ )|2} = E{MuT |U˜1(τ, Cτ )|2} ≤ E{|MuT |4}
1
4E{|U˜1(τ, Cτ )| 83} 34 <∞,
which, together with
Eu{|
∫ τ
0
g(us)ds|2} ≤ E{MuT |
∫ τ
0
|g(us)|ds|2} ≤ E{|MuT |4}
1
4E{|
∫ τ
0
|g(us)|ds| 83} 34 <∞,
implies that (2.12) is well-posed and
Eu{
∫ T
0
|wA,ut |2dt} <∞.
Moreover,
Eu{
∫ T
0
|wAt |2dt} = E{MuT
∫ T
0
|g′(uAt )|2dt} <∞.
Thus
Eu{
∫ T
0
|wAt − wA,ut |2dt} <∞. (6.19)
Now recalling (2.12) and (2.14), we have
WA0 −WA,u0 =
∫ τ
0
[
[g(us)−uswA,us ]−[g(I1(wAs ))−wAs I1(WAs )]
]
ds+
∫ τ
0
[wA,us −wAs ]dBs.
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Since g is convex, we have
g(us)− g(I1(wAs )) ≥ g′(I1(wAs ))[us − I1(wAs )] = wAs [us − I1(wAs )]
with the equality holding true if and only if u = I1(w
A). Then
WA0 −WA,u0 ≥
∫ τ
0
us[w
A
s −wA,us ]ds+
∫ τ
0
[wA,us −wAs ]dBs =
∫ τ
0
[wA,us −wAs ]dBus .
(6.20)
By (6.19), taking expected values we prove WA0 ≥ WA,u0 .
Proof of Proposition 2.3: First, by Definition 2.2 (ii), (2.23) is well-
posed. If u = uτ is optimal, along ∆u we can show, using arguments similar
to those in CWZ (2008), that
∇V P (τ ;u) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
[W P,τ,u
ε
0 −W P,τ,u0 ] = Eu
{
U˜2(τ,Xτ , J(τ,W
1,u
τ ))
∫ τ
0
∆utdB
u
t
+U˜ ′2(τ,Xτ , J(τ,W
1,u
τ ))/U˜
′
1(τ, J(τ,W
A
τ ))
∫ τ
0
g′′(ut)∆utdBut
}
.
and the condition (2.24) is a consequence of maximum principle arguments,
again as in CWZ (2008).
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Note that W˜A0 = − 1γA exp
[−γAWA0 ], so the
optimization of the agent’s utility WA0 is equivalent to the optimization of
W˜A0 . By Ito’s rule, we get
W˜At = Cτ + A˜τ −
∫ τ
t
[
1
2γA
(ZAs )
2 + g(us)
]
ds−
∫ τ
t
ZAs
γA
dBus
= Cτ + A˜τ −
∫ τ
t
[
1
2γA
(ZAs )
2 + g(us)− Z
A
s
γA
us
]
ds−
∫ τ
t
ZAs
γA
dBs (6.21)
By the Comparison Theorem for BSDEs ∗∗, the optimal u is obtained by
minimizing the integrand in the first integral in the previous expression, so
∗∗By the comparison theorem we mean the result of the type as in Proposition 2.1. In
the standard BSDE literature it is proved under Lipschitz conditions, while in Proposition
2.1 we prove it under weaker conditions. Here, we omit all the technical conditions needed
for the comparison theorem.
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that the optimal u is determined from (3.2). This gives us, for the optimal u,
W˜At = Cτ + A˜τ −
∫ τ
t
[
1
2
γA(g
′(us))2 + g(us)− usg′(us)
]
ds−
∫ τ
t
g′(us)dBs,
which obviously implies (3.3).
Proof of Proposition 3.2 . Define
W˜t := W˜
P
t + W˜
A
t − R˜0. (6.22)
Note that W˜0 = W˜
P
0 = − 1γP log(−γPW P0 ). Thus, the principal’s problem is
equivalent to maximizing W˜0. Applying Ito’s formula we have
W˜ Pt = Xτ − Cτ + P˜τ −
∫ τ
t
[
1
2γP
(ZPs )
2 − Z
P
s us
γP
]
ds−
∫ τ
t
(
ZPs
γP
)
dBs (6.23)
Denote
Z˜t :=
ZPt
γP
+ g′(ut), (6.24)
Recalling (6.21) and (3.2), by straightforward calculation we have
W˜t =Xτ + A˜τ + P˜τ − R˜0 −
∫ τ
t
Z˜sdBs
−
∫ τ
t
[
γP
2
Z˜2s − (us + γPg′(us)) Z˜s +
γA + γP
2
(g′(us))2 + g(us)
]
ds.
(6.25)
We now mimic the proof of Proposition 2.3. For any ∆u, denote uε := u+ε∆u,
let W˜ ε, Z˜ε be the corresponding processes, and
∇W˜ := lim
ε→0
1
ε
[W˜ ε − W˜ ]; ∇Z˜ := lim
ε→0
1
ε
[Z˜ε − Z˜].
Then, it can be shown that
∇W˜0 = −
∫ τ
0
∇Z˜sdBs −
∫ τ
0
[
γP Z˜s∇Z˜s − (us + γPg′(us))∇Z˜s
]
ds
−
∫ τ
0
[
− (1 + γPg′′(us)) Z˜s + (γA + γP )g′(us)g′′(us) + g′(us)
]
∆usds.
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If u is optimal, then ∇W˜0 ≤ 0 for any ∆u. Thus
(1 + γPg
′′(ut))Z˜t = (γA + γP )g′(ut)g′′(ut) + g′(ut)
which obviously implies (3.5).
Proof of Proposition 3.3 : Note that g′(u) = ku, g′′(u) = k. Then (i)
is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.1.
To prove (ii), first note that by Proposition 3.2 and (6.24), (3.6) is neces-
sary. On the other hand, for any z,
g(u) +
γA + γP
2
(g′(u))2 + z[γPg′(u) + u] = [k +
γA + γP
2
]u2 + z[γPk + 1]u
is a convex function of u. Then by (6.25) and the comparison theorem for
BSDE’s we know (3.6) is also sufficient.
It remains to prove (iii)-(v). By (6.24) and (3.6), (6.25) leads to
W˜t = Sτ − R˜0 +
∫ τ
t
[
β
2
Z˜2s
]
ds−
∫ τ
t
Z˜sdBs. (6.26)
If β = 0, we get W˜0 = E{Sτ} − R˜0, which obviously implies (iii).
If β 6= 0, denote Wt := exp(βW˜t). Then
dWt = βWtZ˜tdBt, (6.27)
and thus
W0 = E{Wτ} = e−βR˜0E{eβSτ}.
If β > 0, the optimal stopping problem is equivalent to maximizingW0, which
is further equivalent to maximizing E{eβSτ}. This proves (iv). Finally, (v)
can be proved analogously.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. (i) Note that for any stopping time τ ,
E{Sτ} = S0 + E{
∫ τ
0
µsds} ≤ S0 +max
t
∫ t
0
µsds.
If β = 0, by Proposition 3.3 (iii) we prove the result immediately.
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(ii) Assume β > 0. Define a new probability measure Q by
dQ
dP
= exp
{∫ T
0
βρtdBt − 1
2
∫ T
0
β2ρ2tdt
}
.
Then
E
{
eβSτ
}
= EQ
{
eβS0+
∫ τ
0 [
1
2
β2ρ2s+βµs]ds
}
≤ exp
(
βS0 +max
t
∫ t
0
[
1
2
β2ρ2s + βµs]ds
)
.
This proves (ii). One can prove (iii) similarly.
(iv) Recall (3.5). Since A˜t and P˜t are deterministic, it is obvious that
ρt = vt. Moreover, as above, τ is deterministic. Then for t ≤ τ , by (6.27) we
have
Wt = Et{Wτ} = Et{eβ(Sτ−R˜0)} = exp
(
β[S0+
∫ τ
0
µsds−R˜0]+β
∫ t
0
vsdBs+
1
2
β2
∫ τ
t
v2sds
)
.
This implies that, for t < τ ,
dWt = βWtvtdBt,
which, combined with (6.27), implies that Z˜t = vt.
Finally, by (3.3) and (3.6), we can compute Cτ as in (3.8).
Proof of Proposition 4.3: The principal wants to maximize, over Cτ ,
eU1(Cτ )[Xτ − Cτ + Pτ + λ]
We change the variables as Yτ := e
U1(Cτ ) > 0. Then Cτ = J1(log(Yτ )) where
J1 := U
−1
1 . Denote
f(y;x) := y[x− J1(log(y))]; fˆ(x) := sup
y>0
f(y;x).
Then the principal wants to maximize
sup
Yτ>0
f(Yτ ;Xτ + Pτ + λ) = fˆ(Xτ + Pτ + λ).
It is easily shown that yJ1(log(y)) is a convex function. By (4.12) the con-
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jugate fˆ(x) is well defined and is an increasing convex function. If Pt is a
submartingale, then so is Xt + Pt + λ, and therefore fˆ(Xt + Pt + λ) is also
a submartingale. So the solution to the principal’s optimal stopping problem
supτ E[fˆ(Xτ + Pτ + λ)] is τ = T .
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